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SDI SUCCESSES AND SDI FAILURES: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE*
Hans-Henrik Holm**
INTRODUCTION: THE SDI DEBATE IN EUROPE
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars" as the newspapers
have dubbed it, has proven to be perhaps the most important new weapons
program since the development of the nuclear bomb. Naturally, it has also
become the subject of very intense debate and widely differing interpretations.
Some advocates argue that the program has been very successful, developing
more quickly than anyone had anticipated. In a New York Times interview
printed on March 3, 1985, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, until last fall
the director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, said, "There is very
little question that we can build a very highly effective defense against ballistic
missiles some day. The question is how soon and how affordable, and what
degree of effectiveness can initial steps allow us." In the January 20, 1987,
edition of Neue Zuricher Zeitung, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
said that he favours moving quickly towards deploying "phase one," a combi-
nation of landbased ABM systems, airborne infrared sensors and space-based
"kinetic kill vehicles."
Critics, however, have argued that SDI is the major impediment to stopping
the arms race. As a February 20, 1986, Guardian editorial put it, "The major
obstacle to a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons is now the Americans'
attachment to SDI. .. ."
SDI, DETERRENCE AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE
Some say SDI will precipitate a collapse of the North American Treaty
Organization (NATO) and its forty-year alliance. A foreshadowing of this ap-
peared at the NATO meeting in May of 1986; both Norway and Denmark
footnoted the communique produced by the meeting with a strong disapproval
of SDI and its ramifications. Critics point to such activites by NATO's member
nations as evidence of the alliance's gradual weakening. On the other hand,
others argue to the contrary that NATO remains in good shape. Indeed, according
to some, SDI will strengthen the alliance.
Furthermore, while some suggest that nuclear deterrence will be enhanced as
a consequence of SDI, numerous critics argue that it will in fact be destroyed.
These critics anticipate that any defensive buildup will make isolationism a more
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viable alternative for the United States. In the offing, any notion of extended
deterrence will lose credibility.
Finally, some conclude that SDI will disappear with President Ronald Reagan.
Recent congressional reports have argued that SDI, on the grand scale initially
conceived, is nearly technologically impossible. Furthermore, any new president,
including George Bush, confronting the nation's huge budget deficit will be
tempted to halt or scale down the SDI program.
THE MANY FACES OF SDI
In many respects, SDI was a failure from the very beginning. President
Reagan's original speech on March 23, 1983 was calculated to create support for
increased arms funding in the United States Congress. It had the added goal of
diverting attention from the debacle of the intermediate nuclear force reduction
talks. However, the speech failed to accomplish these two objectives. The speech
also failed with regard to the launching of the new program, especially where
the practical implementation of SDI was concerned. No one, or almost no one,
knew of the speech's contents beforehand, and the President created great
confusion-which lasted for quite some time-when he signalled this new initiative
without consulting with all the relevant branches of the United States government.
Consequently, several very different conceptions of SDI, each with its own
political purpose, developed under the umbrella-like rubric of SDI.
SDI as a Defensive Panacea
From the onset, President Reagan had his favorite version of SDI. It would
be a totally leakproof type of continental defense that would not only eliminate
the threat of nuclear destruction, but also render unnecessary any efforts directed
towards deterrence, partial defence or extended deterrence. This so-called "ulti-
mate vision" has been the backdrop against which have developed all other
conceptions of SDI.
SDI as a Research Program
This conception looks at SDI as a genuine effort to test the feasibility of a
total continental defense system. This recognizes that, while the ultimate goal
remains President Reagan's one of full continental antimissile defense, for the
time being SDI must go forward merely as a research program with the purpose
of establishing whether such an end goal is technically feasible or not.
A second viewpoint looks at SDI as a research program, but one with no
actually attainable goal. Holders of this conception feel that, since it is realistically
impossible to foresee where SDI research will lead, there can exist no ultimate
goal or vision. This conception of SDI was, and still is, favored among those
who do not want to have acceptance of the SDI program made contingent on
achieving President Reagan's ultimate goal of a total continental defense system.
SDI as a Method of Enhancing Deterrence
Since SDI involves partial defenses that can conceivably be deployed in the
very near future, those who hew to this conception of SDI primarily view the
program as a means to shield American land-based missiles. Those who advocate
SDI from this point of view envision the program's radar and missile systems as
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creating an elaborate silo protection scheme that may close the so-called "window
of vulnerability."
SDI as an Overall Western Defense
The adherents of this viewpoint contemplate integrating various regional
schemes presently undergoing development amongst America's allies. For those
who subscribe to this viewpoint, the buildup of an enlarged and improved
European inner defense system, combined with an anti-tactical ballistic missile
system, would provide Europe with some sort of protection against nuclear
threats. If such a system could be developed in Europe, in Japan, and perhaps
even in the continental United States, then the possibility of developing a
"thinner" space-based defence system becomes more credible. This is perhaps
what ex-Secretary Weinberger had in mind when he proposed early deployment
of SDI.
SDI as a Bargaining Chip
Proponents of SDI from this point of view look forward to SDI compelling
the Soviets to behave reasonably at the negotiating table. This version, as
advocated by political opponents of the Reagan Administration, still finds support
among many professional diplomats. In a February 1986 Washington Post
column, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) wrote, "The Russians have now
made it clear that they are willing to accept drastic reductions in their long-range
warheads in exchange for limiting SDI to "basic research." The real challenge
is to draw the line between acceptable research-which would allow Mr. Reagan
to explore his dream for a space shield-and unacceptable weapons deployment,
which would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and launch a new and
dangerously destabilizing escalation of the nuclear arms race." Senator Kennedy
sees Soviet-American compromise on SDI as the key to an arms control agreement.
Other prominent proponents of the bargaining chip theory are McGeorge Bundy,
George Kennan, Robert MacNamara and Gerard Smith. They have argued that,
since Reykjavik, both the Reagan followers and their opponents can have their
ways. The former can retain their end-vision of a nuclear-free world, and their
opponents can be satisfied by a ten year delay before any kind of testing
commences.
Apart from the above conceptions of SDI, there exist many other smaller,
more specific versions which are being hawked in the marketplace of ideas. Still,
the above versions define some of the major parameters of the ongoing SDI
debate. One further version deserves mentioning; after Reykjavik, several officials
began to talk about a scaled-down SDI to be put in place when all offensive
nuclear arms have been negotiated away. This SDI should be an insurance against
any attempts at a nuclear "breakout."
It is interesting to note how the SDI program, given its many different
conceptions, can be seen from different viewpoints as both a success and as a
failure. This was demonstrated by actual actions of the Reagan Administration.
For instance, in his July 1986 letter to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gor-
bachev, President Reagan suggested postponing the development of SDI for a
certain period. This indicated that the administration was willing to consider SDI
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not only as an incipient national defense system, but as a sort of bargaining
chip.
SDI TODAY
SDI is very different today from what it was in the beginning. In the United
States a major issue has now become the question of funding. Can this program
continue to grow as other federal expenses are reduced? Can SDI continue to
grow when, as a consequence, limits must be placed on other types of expenditures
in the Defense Department's budget? In addition to these economic questions,
one must ask about the future of both the ABM Treaty and SALT accords.
Public opinion polls show that the United States' population is split on the
SDI issue. The populace generally supports the idea of research, yet when asked
whether they would still support the SDI program if it proves to violate existing
treaties, people's opinions were split.
Among allies of the United States sentiments vary, but overall public senti-
ment is more uniformly opposed to the SDI program than it is within the United
States. To be sure, in several Western European nations both the press and a
number of prominent politicians and advisers have turned against the program
quite strongly. At the same time, however, allied views on SDI have grown to
be much more diverse than they were at the program's outset.
At first there was hesitation to accept SDI, and even outright opposition.
Much of this opposition later evaporated. For example, at the NATO meeting
in Csesme in April 1984 the current West German Defense Minister, Manfred
Worner, expressed very strong reservations about the whole idea. Today he is
one of the staunchest public defenders of the SDI program. Worner is only one
of a number of former European skeptics who have turned into SDI supporters.
There is therefore some basis for the claim of many United States officials that
the SDI program is becoming a success. But before SDI can be characterized as
either a success or a failure, it will be necessary to review how public debate
over the program has evolved.
AN SDI SUCCESS
SDI has indeed come a long way since President Reagan's speech in 1983.
Recently, Lieutenant General Abrahamson acclaimed it a great success by citing
its great technical advances in almost every field. It is impossible, of course, to
discern whether this claim is valid or not. It may just have been a matter of a
Reagan Administration spokesman presenting his case as forcefully as he could.
Aside from any technical merits, however, SDI was, and is, first and foremost
a political program. And politically, at least, SDI has been a success, for it has
not met with general rejection either in the United States or in Europe.
On the contrary, it has not only attracted attention from numerous strategists,
it has shifted the entire strategic debate. It has attracted some degree of support
from every major American ally, and has drawn the attention of its chief
adversary, the Soviet Union. It is important to note that when the program was
presented, it was uniformly opposed by all the allied nations. Today, however,
the countries that have either signed or intend to sign government-to-government
agreements with the United States on SDI comprise an impressive list: the United
Kingdom, Portugal, Japan, Italy, West Germany and Israel. Furthermore, there
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is now movement amongst several nations formerly opposed to SDI; this is the
case of Belgium and also, to a certain degree, of France.
Many of the public reservations that these countries formerly expressed seem
to have disappeared. For example, early in the debate British Foreign Secretary
Sir Geoffrey Howe called the SDI program "a new Maginot Line in space."
Still, in spite of this, Great Britain has eagerly signed up for the SDI program.
West Germany presents a similar case; despite intense debate between rival factions
of the present coalition government, the end result has been an agreement between
the Federal Republic and the United States. The future will undoubtedly bring
more government-to-government agreements with the United States evincing greater
support for the program.
Success has so far been relatively easy to achieve, though-SDI has not had
to "deliver." There have been a few spectacular tests, many of which could
probably have been conducted even without the SDI program. They have, in
themselves, proved nothing. In the final analysis, however, the program's attrac-
tion for most of the countries aligning with the United States on the program
seems to have nothing to do with SDI's technical defensive feasibility. Rather,
the major attraction seems to be the program's potential for valuable technological
spin-offs. But even here, the SDI program has not yet delivered, nor has it been
forced to. No one knows to what extent the program will produce truly useful
technological spin-offs. Indeed, this may never be known. The fundamental fact
of the matter is that SDI's future is still very much up in the air.
FAILURES OF SDI
SDI has mobilized a great deal of opposition. Some have argued that SDI
will increase problems on the conventional force level, that it represents a
confrontational approach to the Soviet Union and that it can only lead to further
arms buildups. Some have seen it as an illustration of the Reagan administration's
contempt for arms negotiations and established political processes. (For a good
exposition of this view, see S. Drell, P. Farley and D. Holloway, The Reagan
Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment
(1985)).
SDI has also met with some scorn in the press and in public opinion. From
the start, it attracted the vaguely derisive nickname "Star Wars." Later attempts
by the Reagan administration to influence the public to see SDI as a purely
defensive measure largely failed.
The SDI program has also encountered difficulties among allies of the United
States. Countries like Australia, Canada, Denmark, Holland, Norway and Spain
have in various ways declined to participate in or to express approval of the
program. Granted, most of these countries are "smaller" allies. But this represents
one of the salient problems exacerbated by SDI: the growing split between the
larger and smaller contries within the Western alliance.
Furthermore, SDI pits experts against experts. Every country in the Western
alliance has experienced divisions of opinion within its scientific and military
ranks over SDI's feasibility, desirability and usefulness.
SDI has other problems. It has the budget tide against it, for it is an
exorbitantly expensive program. Present initiatives in the United States Congress
towards a balanced budget work directly against SDI. Cuts have already begun
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to appear. Time is against it. In a democracy, any long and stretched-out program
inevitably encounters difficulties. It loses support; it loses momentum. Especially
in the absence of any agreement over what SDI really is, fast and immediate
results will undoubtedly be impossible to achieve. Finally, against this backdrop
there currently rages a debate as to whether SDI comports with American treaty
obligations and, if not, whether the United States should disregard those obli-
gations.
Economic questions obviously loom large, for potential SDI funding from
Congress and, indeed, from allied governments depends on the technological
advances promised by the program. With this in mind, an evaluation of SDI's
technological merits from the "outside" on the basis of unclassified information,
presents the following two questions: First, will SDI technologies which scientists
have developed in theory or in simulation actually work when integrated into
full-scale complex weapon systems? Second, will these systems work effectively
against a determined adversary using all its technological expertise?
Answers to these questions seem to lie some years in the future. So do these:
If SDI systems were emplaced, could citizens of the Western nations ever be sure
they would work as their governments intended? What political leader would
dare disregard offensive threats by placing his or her faith in a man-made system
subject to human fallibility?
These questions are not very different from the questions faced by the
Western alliance today. The main difference is that today, even though no one
can be certain of the reliability or capability of the West's many missiles, the
same doubts apply equally to the East's weapons. Therefore, there exists a strong
disincentive against either side using them. At the very least, the harm from such
an exchange would surely outweigh any imaginable gains for an aggressor.
By the same logic, an argument based on stability can be constructed. This
would rely on the premise that both superpowers switch from offensive to
defensive weapons. By any account, however, this transition would require a lot
more trust and detailed negotiation than can conceivably be mustered at the
present.
THE FUTURE OF SDI
What will happen, then, to the SDI program?
SDI will never materialize in any of of its grand visions. This conclusion
was reached by a panel of very diverse experts in a study published by the
congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
Furthermore, the West is not about to discard deterrence as the fundamental
principle of the alliance's defense. For not only the West's strategy, but also its
relationship with the East depends upon it. But the debate which President
Reagan has created by introducing SDI into world politics will probably inspire
greater efforts by the Western alliance to conventionalize its arms and strategy.
Perhaps this debate will even lend impetus to the push for nuclear-free zones in
the allied nations, or to campaigns that demand that the United States foreswear
any first use of nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, SDI can be counted on to continue as a weapons modernization
and research program. It will also probably foster greater strategic technological
control amongst the allies. A recent agreement between West Germany and the
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United States heavily stresses the mutual control of technology. It plainly illus-
trates the concerns and the strategy of the United States government by trying
to limit the transfer of potentially sensitive technology to the Soviet Union.
SDI will undoubtedly eventually produce more sophisticated weaponry. But
all the talk about "Fortress America" or "Fortress Russia" is more appropriately
regarded as sensational headlines than as actual prospects. Neither in economic,
nor in political, nor in strategic terms can any of the superpowers by any means
whatsoever isolate itself from the rest of the world.
SDI is therefore not nearly as dangerous as one side of the debate has tried
to make it appear. It is, nevertheless, a major weapons program with considerable
political backing and considerable political consequences. As such, it merits the
full attention of all the citizens of the allied West.

